Abstract:
A function f∶0,1n→ 0,1 is called an approximate AND-homomorphism if choosing x,y∈n uniformly at random, we have that f(x∧ y) = f(x)∧ f(y) with probability at least 1−ε, where x∧ y = (x1∧ y1,…,xn∧ yn). We prove that if f∶ 0,1n → 0,1 is an approximate AND-homomorphism, then f is δ-close to either a constant function or an AND function, where δ(ε) → 0 as ε→ 0. This improves on a result of Nehama, who proved a similar statement in which δ depends on n. Our theorem implies a strong result on judgement aggregation in computational social choice. In the language of social choice, our result shows that if f is ε-close to satisfying judgement aggregation, then it is δ(ε)-close to an oligarchy (the name for the AND function in social choice theory). This improves on Nehama’s result, in which δ decays polynomially with n. Our result follows from a more general one, in which we characterize approximate solutions to the eigenvalue equation f = λ g, where is the downwards noise operator f(x) = y[f(x ∧ y)], f is [0,1]-valued, and g is 0,1-valued. We identify all exact solutions to this equation, and show that any approximate solution in which f and λ g are close is close to an exact solution.
