02/02/2021

A Market-Inspired Bidding Scheme for Peer Review Paper Assignment

Reshef Meir, Jérôme Lang, Julien Lesca, Nicholas Mattei, Natan Kaminsky

Keywords:

Abstract: We propose a market-inspired bidding scheme for the assignment of paper reviews in large academic conferences. We provide an analysis of the incentives of reviewers during the bidding phase, when reviewers have both private costs and some information about the demand for each paper; and their goal is to obtain the best possible k papers for a predetermined k. We show that by assigning `budgets' to reviewers and a `price' for every paper that is (roughly) proportional to its demand, the best response of a reviewer is to bid sincerely, i.e., on her most favorite papers, and match the budget even when it is not enforced. This game-theoretic analysis is based on a simple, prototypical assignment algorithm. We show via extensive simulations on bidding data from real conferences, that our bidding scheme would substantially improve both the bid distribution and the resulting assignment.

The video of this talk cannot be embedded. You can watch it here:
https://slideslive.com/38948645
(Link will open in new window)
 0
 0
 0
 0
This is an embedded video. Talk and the respective paper are published at AAAI 2021 virtual conference. If you are one of the authors of the paper and want to manage your upload, see the question "My papertalk has been externally embedded..." in the FAQ section.

Comments

Post Comment
no comments yet
code of conduct: tbd Characters remaining: 140

Similar Papers